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USING THE PERVASIVE METHOD OF TEACHING LEGAL ETHICS 
IN A PROPERTY COURSE 
THOMAS L. SHAFFER* 
The first-year introductory course in property law is about all that is left of 
the traditional black-box curriculum.  It is where beginning law students cope 
with and despair of the arcana of English common law; where, with more 
detachment than, say, in the torts course, analysis of appellate opinions is what 
“thinking like a lawyer” means, with no more than peripheral and begrudging 
attention to modern legislation and administrative law; where legal reasoning 
is a stretching exercise and initiatory discipline.  And, incidentally, surviving 
bravely the rude invasion of teachers of public law, it is where a teaching 
lawyer can point out that most lawyers spend most of their time in their law 
offices.  Property is probably the only legal setting left where Washington, 
D.C., can be regarded as a foreign capital. 
My impression is that those of us who teach Property in the first year have 
attended more to Watergate and the consequent invention of “professional 
responsibility” than we have attended to the codification of our legal material: 
We have become self-conscious about noticing the “ethical” issues that appear 
in or are obscured by appellate judges’ selective rendition of facts.  The elders 
among us remember but have come to disapprove of Professor Kingsfield’s 
disdain for moral concern: “Ethics, schmethics: Ethics is for Episcopalians,”1 
has become of late a less characteristic rejoinder to a bold student’s moral 
disapproval of a judicial outcome or a legal argument. 
As part of this modern trend due, no doubt, to the fact that accreditors now 
require schools to teach ethics,2 compilers of casebooks are beginning to raise 
moral issues in their discussion notes.  We are attempting to mix ethical 
analysis with traditional property-law distinctions and with bits of invitations 
to jurisprudence and legal anthropology.  There is even a movement now to 
encourage Property teachers to attend to “professional responsibility” in 
 
* Robert and Marion Short Professor of Law Emeritus, University of Notre Dame. 
 1. A remark, rather like the fabled, “If you wanted to study ethics you should have gone to 
divinity school.”  This version comes from Professor William Geimer, quoting one of his 
teachers. 
 2. DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE: REFORMING THE LEGAL 
PROFESSION 200 (2000) (describing the development of legal ethics courses in law schools). 
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traditional law courses with what is coming to be called the “pervasive 
method.”3 
Pervasive-method, property course teaching of ethics is the subject of these 
observations, by an aging law teacher who thinks he responds to all modern 
trends, and who was commissioned by four colleagues to devise material for 
discussion in two editions of a property casebook published in the West 
Casebook Series.4  Notice three guidelines that seem to me to apply to the 
enterprise of devising materials and then using them in the enterprise of 
engaging property students in moral discourse: 
First, the objective is moral engagement with students, and this by a 
teacher who may not otherwise think of herself as teaching ethics (which, after 
all, is an ancient and complex art: Ask Plato and John Calvin).  “Pervasive” 
would seem to imply not only planting or noticing moral issues but also being 
prepared to discuss them with something like depth.  Pervasive teaching of 
ethics implies at least disapproval of the practice of bringing in or temporarily 
adopting the vestments of a guest ethics guru, like the preacher coming to say a 
few words over the grave in Boot Hill, or the military chaplain giving the 
monthly character-guidance lecture to low-ranking military people in the post 
theater. 
None of us claims the skill of Socrates at this work.  We all have to learn 
to listen, more than we do to see if students understand analytical legal 
distinctions.  I remember a first-year student who answered a case-note 
analytical (legal) provocation in one of my classes with a cosmic judgment 
such as, “That is just immoral.”  I was by then (a couple of decades into 
teaching, survivor of many movements) too sensitive to say, “If you wanted to 
study morals, you should have gone to divinity school.”  I tried a lame, “Oh? 
Why do you think that?”  She said, “I don’t know.  I guess it is because I was 
raised in the Southern Baptist Church.”5  That, although I did not see it clearly 
at the time, is a teaching moment.  It is a “tell us more” moment.  It is where 
pervasive teaching begins.  It is a chance to notice, aloud, that it is legitimate, 
in the Property classroom, to ask and discover what the moral life is like for a 
lawyer doing this stuff.6 
 
 3. Id. at 201-02. 
 4. SANDRA H. JOHNSON, PETER W. SALSICH, JR., THOMAS L. SHAFFER & MICHAEL 
BRAUNSTEIN, PROPERTY LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS (2d ed. 1998) (Professor 
Braunstein did not join in the first edition; Professor Timothy S. Jost was a co-editor). 
 5. For more on this story, see Thomas L. Shaffer, Moral Moments in Law School, in 4 SOC. 
RESP.: JOURNALISM, L., MED. 32, 38 (Louis W. Hodges ed., 1978). 
 6. I compliment myself for somehow having created an atmosphere in which a first-year 
student was willing to tell her classmates where she goes to church and why that might make a 
difference in her legal education and theirs.  See generally THOMAS L. SHAFFER & ROBERT S. 
REDMOUNT, LAWYERS, LAW STUDENTS, AND PEOPLE (1977), and RHODE, supra note 2, at 45-47 
(discussing ways for a lawyer to gain professional fulfillment). 
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Second, it follows that the moral life for a lawyer doing this stuff is a 
moral life carried out in a certain kind of lawyer’s place.  Property practice is 
green-eyeshade, Wednesday-afternoon law practice.  It is carried out in an 
office, with one or two clients and no one else present.  One way or another, 
most of us now carry influence from the late Professor Louis M.  Brown and 
his preventive-law emphasis7—I even have a preventive-law tie Louis gave 
me.  We are inclined to point out that, in preventive (office) law, law comes 
before fact.  However in what Louis called “curative” law, as in appellate 
opinions, fact came before law.  That means the difference between a land 
contract and a lease, between a life estate and a fee simple, is a chosen 
difference, not the consequence of noticing a fact but the creation of a fact so 
that law will follow.  It is a more flexible kind of law practice than litigation is, 
more open to creativity and moral direction.8 
Third, “pervasive” implies educational planning, some attention to learning 
theory, or at least attention to sequence in the way issues come up in law 
classes.  Conflict of interest is a familiar example:9  Pigg v.  Haley,10 in the 
teaching book I have worked on, comes up in the introductory common-law-
estates part of the course.  It is there to introduce the difference between life 
estates and fees simple.  It involved an aging farming couple in rural Virginia 
who were fond of the husband’s young cousin and who evidently wanted the 
cousin to have the farm when they were both gone.  The common-law-estates 
issue arose after the husband died; it involved an ambiguous holographic will, 
followed by an ambiguous, lawyer-drafted family settlement agreement. 
The casebook notes that followed the Virginia Supreme Court’s opinion11 
drew attention to the human relationships around the wife and the beloved 
cousin in two “ethical” contexts: (1) the day the wife and cousin agreed, in the 
law office, to resolve the ambiguities in the holograph with an agreement that 
gave her the husband’s personal property and a life estate in the farm, 
remainder to the cousin; and (2) the fact that only one lawyer was working this 
deal out, for both parties, and committing it to a written agreement.12 
 
 7. See generally LOUIS M. BROWN, LAWYERING THROUGH LIFE: THE ORIGIN OF 
PREVENTIVE LAW chs. 22-24, 26 and pp. 265-94 (1986). 
 8. See generally LOUIS M. BROWN & THOMAS L. SHAFFER, TOWARD A JURISPRUDENCE 
FOR THE LAW OFFICE, 17 AM. J. OF JURISPRUDENCE 125 (1972) (discussing the decisional 
process occurring in the law office); see also SANDRA H. JOHNSON, PETER W. SALSICH, JR. & 
THOMAS L. SHAFFER, PROPERTY LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 95-101 (1992). 
 9. See generally CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS, chs. 7-8 (1986). 
 10. 294 S.E.2d 851 (Va. 1982), discussed in JOHNSON ET AL., supra note 4, at 115. 
 11. JOHNSON ET AL., supra note 4, at 121-25. 
 12. Other lawyers later devised the argument that the cousin did not give consideration for 
the agreement, got the trial judge to buy their argument, and defended it in the Virginia Supreme 
Court, where they lost. 
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There is material in that law-office scene for looking at the regulatory rules 
on conflicts of interest, which is a useful thing to do, and one the book returns 
to at several other points in the course: in conveyancing situations,13 in escrow 
practice,14 in one lawyer handling title problems for both purchaser and 
lender15 and in law-office arrangements for what our book called “the law of 
neighbors,” meaning easements, servitudes, et cetera.16 
As useful as a regulatory (let’s look at the rules) use of the casenote would 
be for students, and as useful as it would be to return to the regulatory issues in 
later contexts in the course, the rules are, in my view, a superficial way to 
respond to the teaching moment, which, like the remark of my Southern 
Baptist student, was a chance to imagine the moral life of a lawyer doing this 
work.17 
It is unclear what the human relationship between the couple and the 
cousin had been—except that both said on the record that it was “close.”  If 
there was more in the record regarding their relationship, the judges of the 
Supreme Court of Virginia were not interested in it.  It is not known what the 
relationship between the cousin and the widow had become.  They had, after 
the husband’s death, contracted to sell some of the farm to third parties—the 
judges do not say why.  It seems a fair guess that these sets of relationships had 
everything to do with the work of the lawyer who drew up the family-
settlement agreement, talked to the cousin and the widow about it, and set them 
up for litigation all the way to the state’s highest court.  This sort of discussion 
material has to be imagined in the Property classroom.  It lies in the 
imaginations of those who are present for discussion, all of whom have 
mothers, many of whom have cousins and some of whom know something 
about farming.18 
Another way to put the moral inquiry would be to say that it has to do with 
trust—with trust probably too quickly given by these clients to their lawyer, 
and with trust unexplored between this farm widow and a young man who 
appears to have been a surrogate son for her (or perhaps her late husband’s 
surrogate son who never became a surrogate son for her).  However this human 
stuff is imagined for purposes of discussion, it puts human faces on common-
 
 13. JOHNSON ET AL., supra note 4, at 516-17. 
 14. Id. at 541. 
 15. Id. at 537. 
 16. Id. at 643-44, 763-66. 
 17. See generally Thomas L. Shaffer, Beyond the Rules: The Responsibility and Role of 
Continuing Legal Education to Teach Alternative Ethical Considerations, in AMERICAN LAW 
INSTITUTE AND AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, C.L.E. AND THE LAWYER’S RESPONSIBILITIES IN 
AN EVOLVING PROFESSION 493-516 (Report on the Arden House III Conference 1987). 
 18. See generally Thomas L. Shaffer, On Teaching Ethics With Stories About Clients, 39 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 421 (1998) (discussing teaching legal ethics in a clinic). 
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law estates and illustrates, in a variety of ways, the way trust works between 
lawyers and their clients.19 
There is a spectrum of teaching skills involved here, enough so that 
“pervasive” teaching of this conflict-of-interest issue is possible across the 
variety of personalities that attract a lawyer to property teaching.  The 
regulators have an array of rules, some of them relatively useful, for testing the 
issue.  Some of these—notably the ones that turn on “independent professional 
judgment”20—are at least mildly interesting for ethics, if only because they 
focus more on the protection of lawyers than on the well-being of clients.  
Noticing the regulatory apparatus in this early context in the property course 
sets up opportunities to notice how it works in other contexts such as 
conveyancing, title assurance and land use.  The “professional responsibility” 
material is more like the provisions of a driver’s license manual than like the 
ethics that would have interested Aristotle or Martin Luther, but there is 
something to be said for learning the rules of the road on which our students 
will be driving.  I prefer to work with Luther and Aristotle “and all them other 
high-falutin’ Greeks”21 first, then check the regulatory apparatus to see if a 
lawyer can manage to be a good person without losing her ticket. 
The law-office challenge in property law is not to make sure clients will 
win if there is a dispute, but to make sure there will not be a dispute—and if 
there is a dispute, that the lawyer’s clients’ will have a way to work out the 
dispute without destroying their fortunes and their regard for one another—
after all, they came to the office together.  A good property-teaching book, in 
my opinion, provides learning along the way on the uses of alternative dispute 
resolution and the skills involved in a lawyer planning for it.22 
Both of these preventive-law considerations, and a deeper agenda for 
talking about the skills of helping clients with differing interests who remain 
represented by just one lawyer, call for imagination and creativity from 
students.  My experience is that, in a first-year class, after they have been 
battered with the feudal land system, livery of seisin and the Statute of Uses, 
students are anxious to talk about the moral life. 
 
 19. For another similar family situation, see generally Johnson v. Hendrickson, 24 N.W.2d 
914 (S.D. 1946).  JOHNSON ET AL., supra note 4, at 210-16. 
 20. As in “independence of professional judgment” in Rule 1.8(f)(2) of the Rules of 
Professional Conduct, or “exercise of his professional judgment” in D.R. 5-101(A) of the Model 
Code of Professional Responsibility.  For the rules and annotation material on them, see STEPHEN 
GILLERS & ROY D. SIMON, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: STATUTES AND STANDARDS 103-17, 
485-96 (1999). 
 21. Meredith Wilson, Piano Lesson, from THE MUSIC MAN (Kermit Bloomgarden et al., 
producers, 1957), available at http://www.themusicmanonline.com/Songs/4Piano.htm. 
 22. For two examples, among a dozen or so opportunities for discussion and role-playing, on 
mediation in that casebook, see generally JOHNSON ET AL., supra note 4, 632, 759-63. 
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Finally, then, there are devices for teaching that expand discussion.  The 
meeting of the widow, the cousin and the lawyer is a dramatic scene; teachers 
from the somewhat discredited “human potential” school might think here 
about role-playing the relationship, or part of it.23  Notice, for just one aspect of 
this, that most property lawyers, including this one, would not want that 
Virginia lawyer to have talked to either the wife or the cousin alone.  That 
means keeping them together, talking to them together, and, thereby, probably, 
assuring that the conversation will never get as deep as it might if the lawyer 
talked to them one at a time—a tragic aspect of mediative law practice.  Such a 
practice follows from Louis D.  Brandeis’ “lawyer for the situation” ethics, 
from Professor Geoffrey Hazard’s modern rendition of it, and, in my 
experience, from Rule 2.2 of the American Bar Association’s Rules of 
Professional Conduct.24  It does not preclude advertent resort to more formal 
mediation, but that resort seems unlikely on the law-office facts as they appear 
in Pigg v. Haley.25  Keeping the conversation in the one-lawyer, two-clients 
setting, short of formal mediation, carries the risk of superficial concern.  
Perhaps it is just as well that undertaking ethical discussion with property 
students recognizes that the moral life involves pain as often as it promises 
triumph. 
The law-office focus also demonstrates that moral direction is typically set 
by conscience at work away from the judiciary and away from public 
accountability.  Certainly, morally questionable decisions on, say, land use, 
condominium administration, development of residential neighborhoods, and 
lease provisions are open to journalists and discussion in public forums, but 
those cases of public scrutiny of property law are a minor part of a property 
lawyer’s work.  A preventive-law teacher can (as I, alas, have) swell up 
pontifically and say that property law in a courtroom is evidence of failure.  No 
doubt, a focus on the law office in first-year property teaching leaves 
something out, but it is so much the dominant reality, and so important, that 
focusing on such things as takings law can be sacrificed for the moment and 
brought to the attention of the constitutional law teacher (who has probably 
picked up for her courses all the credit hours that were taken out of the 
property curriculum). 
If that is so, it means that the ethical focus Robert F. Cochran, Jr. and I 
have suggested for teaching legal ethics is prominent.  That focus, in a phrase, 
has a lawyer asking a client, or, even better, a client asking a lawyer, “What 
 
 23. See generally THOMAS L. SHAFFER & JAMES R. ELKINS, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND 
COUNSELING: IN A NUTSHELL, 321-71 (3d ed. 1997) (suggesting exercises for role-playing legal 
interviews). 
 24. See generally THOMAS L. SHAFFER, AMERICAN LEGAL ETHICS: TEXT, READINGS, AND 
DISCUSSION TOPICS 289-308 (1985) (discussing the codification of Brandeis’ ethic through 
Professor Hazard’s draft rules). 
 25. 294 S.E.2d 851 (Va. 1982). 
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would be fair?”26  What would be fair in carving up spaces and providing for 
surface-water drainage in a land development?  What would be fair in planning 
for land use with proposals to local government, or in drafting and imposing 
use covenants?  What is fair in drafting provisions for commercial and 
residential leases? 
Some of this issue of law-office fairness has to do with disputes.  In the 
early days of a dispute, when another lawyer’s client, or potential client, is not 
in the room but is already an adversary, it is important for office lawyers to 
think about, teach about and invite alternative dispute resolution, so that the 
possibilities are not lost that people can be good neighbors in the face of such 
things as adverse possession and easements, implied warranties of habitability 
in the rental and sale of residential real property, and even such eventually 
implacable judicial possibilities as loan default and foreclosure.  Teaching 
materials for Property need therefore to include significant material on 
planning for and urging formal mediation and arbitration, for all of the 
customary reasons, fiscal and humane.27 
My thoughts turn, though, to being fair as a first move—which, I think, is 
what Bob Cochran had in mind in our ethics book.28  Here is an example from 
my relatively recent practice as a supervising attorney in an Indiana legal aid 
clinic: 
Indiana’s legislative and judicial landlord-tenant law comes, mostly 
unchanged, from territorial days.29  We had self-help evictions until a year or 
two ago.  It is not clear that we have useful law on retaliatory evictions.  Our 
warranty-of-habitability (case) law is relatively primitive (such as, there is no 
such thing as rent withholding).  There is not much chance for successful 
attack on drastic, tenant-hostile lease provisions.  If I were an advisor to 
landlords, I would have frequent opportunities to ask my clients, “What would 
be fair?”  The moral issue I want to present, however, comes from my 
experience as an advisor to tenants. 
About the only piece of progressive landlord-tenant law in Indiana is its 
statute on security deposits and its judicial aftermath.30  The statute provides 
that the landlord account for use of the tenant’s security deposit within forty-
five days of the time the tenant vacates the premises and gives the landlord a 
 
 26. See generally THOMAS L. SHAFFER & ROBERT F. COCHRAN, JR., LAWYERS, CLIENTS, 
AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 113-34 (1994) (suggesting a framework for moral discourse). 
 27. See, e.g., supra note 22. 
 28. SHAFFER & COCHRAN, supra note 26. 
 29. See generally IND. CODE ANN. § 32-7 (Michie 1995 repl. vol.), much of which dates 
from the nineteenth century. 
 30. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 32-7-5 (Michie 2001); Greasel v. Troy, 690 N.E.2d 298 
(Ind. Ct. App. 1998); Pinnacle Properties v. Saulka, 693 N.E.2d 101 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998); Turley 
v. Hyton, 751 N.E.2d 249 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001); Michael A. Dorelli & Joseph C. Bowman, 
Property Law: Recent Developments in Property Law, 32 IND. L. REV. 973, 988-91 (1999). 
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new address.31  If the landlord fails to account, the tenant has a cause of action 
for return of the security deposit and attorneys fees.32  The judicial gloss from 
the Indiana Court of Appeals is that the landlord who fails to account in a 
timely manner not only loses recovery from the security deposit but also loses 
all claims to recovery for damages to the property and unpaid rent.33  The risk 
to landlords who tend to rejoice at the departure of bad tenants and look to the 
future as they clean up the mess is significant, and in my experience, not all of 
them—not even all of the corporate ones, nor even their lawyers—are familiar 
with the prompt accounting requirement in the security-deposit statute.34 
And so into my legal-aid office comes a single mom who has a minimum-
wage job and three small children.  She has been told that her leasehold is 
ended for failure to pay rent and for extensive damage to the apartment she has 
been renting.  I have to tell her that she is vulnerable to judicial eviction, which 
will take about a week, since Indiana eviction law has tight notice 
requirements;35 that her complaints that the windows are broken and the 
upstairs toilet leaks through the floor are not defenses to eviction or to liability 
for at least some of the rent; that she can call the code enforcement office if she 
wants, but that any actions it takes cannot keep her in the apartment; and that 
her best course of action is to locate another place to live and let me bargain a 
little time from the landlord for her to move her children and her furniture. 
That’s the bad news.  The good news (believe it or not) is maybe that the 
damages issue is not as bad as it looks.  The landlord can probably demonstrate 
liability for damages of a couple of thousand dollars, and liability for unpaid 
rent of an equal amount—say four thousand dollars altogether.  If the landlord 
gets a judgment for these amounts (at a hearing set at the time the possessory 
action is filed, but for a later court date), she is vulnerable to the loss of her 
five-hundred dollar security deposit, and to garnishment on her wages and 
savings (probably nothing, but sometimes somebody wins the lottery), for, say, 
four thousand dollars plus attorneys fees, interest, and costs. 
The perhaps good news is the possibility that she can avoid these liabilities 
by giving the landlord her new address when she moves, and then keeping her 
head down for forty-five days.36  The landlord may fail, for forty-five days, to 
account on the security deposit.  If he could keep it, it would only cover a 
fourth or a fifth of his claim.  He needs a judgment for the whole amount and 
 
 31. IND. CODE ANN. § 32-7-5. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. My left-leaning jurisprudence tempts me to add that this is because landlords and their 
lawyers assume that Indiana landlord-tenant law always favors landlords, which, in most 
contexts, is a safe assumption. 
 35. IND. CODE ANN. §§ 32-7-9, 32-6-5 (Michie 2001). 
 36. See IND. CODE ANN. § 32-7-5.  
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can then, he might think, just deduct the security deposit, which he already has, 
from the amount of the judgment. 
If the landlord does not provide a thorough accounting,37 we can, in the 
damages hearing, defeat his four thousand dollar claim, recover the security 
deposit, and get an order for fees to help the legal-aid clinic with its expenses.  
The result we would shoot for is, for example, a six thousand dollar judgment 
for the tenant, against the landlord, and a judgment of zero for the landlord 
against the tenant.  We may need to file a counterclaim.  If, as is unlikely, the 
landlord has not filed for damages, my client can file her own action, waiting 
until after the forty-five days passes.  If the landlord has filed for damages, and 
the hearing date is within forty-five days, my client can file for a continuance, 
without disclosing why she wants more time. 
This strategy works, in my experience, more often than one might think.  
The key to it is to keep our heads down for forty-five days and not in any way 
let the landlord know what we have in mind.  We say nothing about damages 
or the security deposit when we bargain for the time for her to move out of the 
apartment, nothing when we seek a continuance on the damages hearing, if we 
have to do that, and nothing when landlord and tenant run into one another at 
the supermarket. 
Moral issue: Would this be fair?  Should a lawyer, hardened toward 
landlords by years of helping low-income tenants and the victims of a hundred 
kinds of creditor oppression, even ask that question?38  What should the lawyer 
say if his client asks that question?  How about the fact that mom-and-pop 
landlords are often as low on the wealth scale as tenants are, and are not 
represented by lawyers who do not charge fees?  If these questions, or some of 
them, are asked, and the client, a thoughtful and honorable person says, “Go 
ahead,” does the lawyer still have a moral problem?  I confess that I have not 
asked the question and, if my client asked the question and then said, “Go 
ahead,” I probably would go ahead. 
Lurking in that discussion is an important agenda for property-law 
teachers, and that, put with an academic cast, is the agenda of social justice—
how much (as a left-leaning teacher might think of it) of property law, and 
especially landlord-tenant law, especially in Indiana, serves the ruling class 
and how little of it has to do with decent housing for low-income people?39  
That question can be put in legal-ethics terms, and may be different when 
taken up that way: Is a lawyer for poor people entitled to a special ethic?  
 
 37. See Pinnacle Properties v. Saulka, 693 N.E.2d 101 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998). 
 38. See generally MERCHANTS OF MISERY: HOW CORPORATE AMERICA PROFITS FROM 
POVERTY (Michael Hudson ed., 1996), to help get in the right mood, although little of it is about 
landlords. 
 39. See generally Thomas L. Shaffer, Jews, Christians, Lawyers, and Money, 25 VT. L. REV. 
451 (2001). 
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Suppose, if I were representing landlords, I would never do anything this 
sneaky, and never advise my landlord-client to do anything this sneaky: Does 
that supposition preclude a different answer when my client is a tenant? 
Our casebook, largely thanks to the learning and leadership of Professor 
Peter W.  Salsich, Jr.,40 provides discussion material on fair housing, housing 
for the homeless, the encounter between land developers and family farmers, 
and on the habitability and its consequences in the inner city.41  It does not yet 
provide this little, as the ethics teachers put it, “dilemma.”  Maybe it should. 
 
 
 40. Professor Salsich has contributed an essay to this Teaching Property Issue: Peter W. 
Salsich, Jr., Property Law Serves Human Society: A First Year Course Agenda, 46 ST. LOUIS U. 
L.J. 617 (2002). 
 41. See generally JOHNSON ET AL., supra note 4. 
